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ARTICLES 
ADVANCING TOLERANCE AND EQUALITY 
USING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: ARE THE BOY 
SCOUTSPREPARED?* 
Rachel A. Van Cleave ** 
Fear leads to anger, 
anger leads to hate, and 
hate leads to suffering. 
Yoda, in STAR WARS EPISODE I: 
THE PHANToM MENACE (LUCASFILM LTD. 1999) 
1. INTRODUCTION: INTOLERANCE AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Intolerance remains a significant problem in the United States. 
The recent shooting spree at a Jewish Community Center in Los 
Angeles illustrates the persistent historical menace of religious 
intolerance.1 The violent murder of James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Tex-
as exemplifies racial intolerance even years after desegregation.2 In 
* © Rachel A. Van Cleave, 1999. All rights reserved. 
** Associate Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. Stanford Uni-
versity, 1986; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1989; J.S.M. 
Stanford Law School, 1994. I am indebted to Alison G. Myhra, Joseph Schottland, and 
Linda S. Eckols for serving as sounding boards and for reviewing drafts, and to my 
research assistants Jack W. Hill and Juan Carlos Rodriguez. I dedicate this paper to 
Natasha Van Cleave-Schottland with the hope that she and her generation will see the 
end of intolerance. 
1. See Ed Vulliamy, US Nazis Find Their Latest Hero, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 15, 
1999, at 20. In June of 1999 in Sacramento, California, three synagogues were the 
targets of arson that caused over one million dollars in damage. See Preachers of Hate 
Must Be Condemned, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 1999, at A20. Certainly, such intolerance 
does not always result in violence. See, e.g., Gulfport, Mississippi: Family Suing School 
After Its Board Banned 15-Year-Old Jewish Student from Wearing Star of David Neck-
lace (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 19, 1999). 
2. See Stephen F. Holder, Texas Man's Slaying Was a Hate Crime, NAACP Says, 
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Laramie, Wyoming, Matthew Shepard's brutal murder highlights 
the threat of violence prompted by sexual orientation intolerance.3 
The criminal justice system has responded to these types of hate-
motivated crimes with punishment enhancements in the hopes of 
deterring violent intolerance.4 Recognizing that hateful speech, 
short of violence, can have harmful psychological effects particular-
lyon younger victims, many schools have adopted hate speech regu-
lations to ensure that all students are able to "participate equally 
in the learning process. »5 The above examples focus on the person 
who has behaved violently or hatefully. In addition, there have 
been attempts to ease the suffering of victims and their families 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1999, at 9A (describing the death of an Mrican-American 
man who "was dragged to death behind a pickup truck"); see also Taking on Hate 
Crime, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 1999, at A20 [hereinafter Hate Crime]. 
3. See Bob Hohler, A Legacy of Friends and Tolerance; Death in Wyoming Stirs 
Clinton Plea, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 1998, at Aa; Slain Wyoming Student Remembered 
for a Trusting Nature, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1998, at A16. Earlier this summer, in 
Redding, California, a shooting caused the death of two gay men in their shared home. 
See Hate Crime, supra note 2. Often hate crimes involve more than one type of victim. 
For example, the suspect charged in the shooting spree at the Jewish Community Center 
confessed to killing a Filipino postal worker. See Vulliamy, supra note 1. Another exam-
ple of such multiple hate crimes is the three-day shooting spree in Indiana and Illinois, 
which targeted African-Americans, Jews, and Asians. See Hate in America: Four Notable 
Cases, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 8, 1999, at 17A. For additional descriptions of 
bias-motivated crimes, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE AsSISTANCE, A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO 
HATE CRIMES 1-2, 14-15 (1997). 
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1999); 
TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.014 (West 1999); see also Bruce Tomaso, Gore Speaks 
out for Stiffer Hate-Crime Law: VP Tells Urban League Conference Such Offenses "Fun_ 
damentally Different," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 10, 1999, at 15A (urging passage of 
federal hate crimes law that passed the Senate but stalled in the House); Anti-Defama-
tion League, 1999 Hate Crimes Laws (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.adl.orgl99hate 
crime/text_Iegis.html> (proposing a model statute). Interestingly, only four months after 
Matthew Shepard's murder, the Wyoming legislature failed to pass a hate crime law. See 
Hate Crimes Legislation Is Defeated in Wyoming, HouS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1999, at A9. 
5. Alison G. Myhra, The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68 N.D. 
L. REv. 71, 74 (1992); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 439 (calling segregation a 
"demeaning, caste-creating practice"). For additional discussions of campus speech codes, 
see Thomas C. Grey, How to Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying: Reflections on 
the Stanford Experience, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 891, 947-56 (1996) (setting out a "funda-
mental standard" as an alternative to a "speech code"). But see Elena Kagan, When a 
Speech Code Is a Speech Code: The Stanford Policy and the Theory of Incidental Re-
straints, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 957, 957-58 (1996) (arguing that the "fundamental 
standard" is in fact a speech code); John T. Shapiro, Note, The Call For Campus Con-
duct Policies: Censorship or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations on Speech, 75 MINN. 
L. REv. 201, 205 (1990) (suggesting that anti-harassment policies could address the 
problem of hate speech on campuses). 
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and friends. After high school students in Maine drowned a gay 
classmate, a teacher attempted to organize an all-day "Symposium 
on Violence," at which representatives of various groups were to 
speak on issues of tolerance with small groups of students.6 Elton 
John performed a benefit concert, which he dedicated to Matthew 
Shepard, the victims at Columbine High School, and other victims 
ofhate.7 Finally, some states have sought to teach tolerance.8 
The above attempts to deter violent intolerance also seek to 
ensure equality.9 Some people find difference threatening. lO Such 
individuals might think, even unconsciously, "if the law protects the 
6. See SoImitz v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 495 A.2d 812, 815, 818 (Me. 1985) (up-
holding the denial of an injunctive order that would have permitted the symposium to 
be held after the Board of Directors of the School Administration District No. 59 voted 
to cancel it). Ironically, an attempt to promote tolerance was thwarted by intolerance. In 
Solmitz, it seems that the symposium was canceled because a homosexual would have 
been a speaker along with other speakers and discussion leaders representing minority 
groups. See id. at 815. 
7. See Kevin McCullen, Elton John Sings Against Hate: Wyoming Concert Dedi-
cated to Shepard, Columbine Victims, RocKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), June 2, 1999, 
at 8A. For other examples of communities attempting to address forms of intolerance, 
see Merle English, Healing Divisiveness with Prayer, Saint Martin de Porres, NEWSDAY, 
June 1, 1999, at A5 (two thousand members of the Broad Channel community met for a 
day of workshops and prayer after a float in a Labor Day parade portrayed, among 
other things, the dragging death of a black man); Mary Evertz, Internet Quilters Piece 
Together Memorial to Hate Crime Victim, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), June 29, 
1999, at 6A (describing a quilt memorial to James Byrd, Jr.); Karen R. Long, Cleveland 
Heights Athletes Promote Rally for Racial Harmony, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), 
Aug. 12, 1999, at 15A (describing a "Walk Against Hate Parade" scheduled at the same 
time as a Ku Klux Klan rally in downtown Cleveland). 
8. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE AsSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 42-43 (describing educa-
tion initiatives in South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey); Kelli Kristine 
Armstrong, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs of Gay Youth 
in Our Public Schools, 24 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 67, 85-92 (1994) (describing numer-
ous programs designed to teach tolerance for sexual orientation differences); 66 HARv. 
EDUC. REV. 173 (1996) (devoting the entire issue to the role of educators regarding the 
issue of sexual orientation). Such educational efforts may require adding to Yoda's formu-
la, "ignorance leads to fear." 
9. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Re-
ligion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 
106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997) (discussing the similarities between the struggle for equality 
by religious groups and by homosexuals, as well as the current clash between the two 
groups); Bobbi Bernstein, Note, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating 
"Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REV. 269 (1995). 
10. See Michael Kramer, Time to Fight Haters - We Don't Need to Be Victims of 
Our Constitutional Rights, DAILY NEWS (New York, N.Y.), Aug. 15, 1999, at 43 ("People 
hate difference, a reality that reflects learned behavior."); Rosemary N. Tomani, Anger 
Spawns Hatred on the Road to Rage, BUFF. NEWS, June 6, 1999, at H2 (stating that the 
violence involved in the Littleton shootings was caused by anger and hatred). 
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rights of those who are different as it protects me, I might be ad-
versely affected." For example, a common argument against same-
gender marriage is that it would have a negative effect on the het-
erosexual marriage, thus taking something away from opposite-
gender marriages. l1 It may be that this fear, however, which can 
lead to hate and intolerance, can be overcome by individuals and 
with small steps.12 That is, as people get to know individuals 
whom they perceive as different, people will usually become at least 
tolerant, perhaps less fearful and less angry, and maybe even ac-
cepting.13 The question then becomes what role the law might 
play, other than to punish the manifestations of hatred, to promote 
tolerance when success may well depend upon individuals having 
personal "contact experiences"14 with people whom such individu-
als perceive as different. Should the law be used to force such con-
tact experiences? More concretely, should courts employ public 
accommodation laws and constitutional protections of equality and 
privacy in a way that might require intolerant people or organi-
zations to include persons perceived as different? One concern with 
using the law in this way is that people, or groups of people who 
are consequently forced into relationships with individuals they 
11. See Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity 
Implications of Same· Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353, 355-56 (1999) 
(identifying this argument and characterizing the tension as "[slame·gender marriage 
[being] about people searching for integrated identities and others jealously and fearfully 
guarding their own" (citing Richard D. Mohr, The Stakes in the Gay Marriage Wars, in 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 105, 106-07 (Robert M. Baird & 
Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997»). 
12. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2473 ("Equality comes on little cat's feet and not 
in a single leap or bound."). 
13. See, e.g., GoRDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJuDICE 278-81 (1954) 
(proposing the "intergroup contact theory"). For application of this theory specifically to preju-
dice on the basis of sexual orientation, see Bernstein, supra note 9, at 271 (discussing 
Gregory M. Herek & Eric K Glunt, Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexuals' Attitudes 
Toward Gay Men: Results from a National Survey, 30 J. SEX RES. 239 (1993». Bernstein 
also discusses a personal case study addressing this theory. See id. at 272-74; see also 
Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, Some of My Best Friends: Intergroup Contact, Conceal-
able Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALI-
TY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996). Ideally, such experiences would result in accep-
tance, thus going beyond mere tolerance. See, e.g., Doris Y. Morrow, Letter to the Editor, 
LUBBOCK AVALANCHE J., Aug. 18, 1999, at 7A (writer, responding to an editorial entitled 
"Ban Gay Boy Scouts," discusses how she came to "love, appreciate and respect" gays 
after learning of her son's homosexuality). 
14. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 272 (discussing Herek & Glunt's three hypothe-
ses). Bernstein also recounts examples of how members of Parents, Families and Friends 
of Lesbian and Gays ("PFFLAG") changed their perspective on gays and lesbians after 
learning that someone close to them was homosexual. See id. at 275. 
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perceive as different, may become even more angry and full of 
hate.15 Thus, a backlash could result, eliminating, or at least lim-
iting, any initial advances in equality. On the other hand, the law's 
approval or allowance of such exclusion may lead individuals in the 
groups to conclude that they are justified in excluding those people 
they perceive as different and perhaps even justified in their hatred 
of people who are different.16 
Two state courts recently confronted these types of issues in 
the context of the Boy Scouts of America's (BSA) exclusion of homo-
sexuals.17 The supreme courts of New Jersey and California 
reached opposite conclusions on the issue of whether the BSA may 
exclude homosexuals from membership. IS Both cases involved the 
statutory interpretation question of whether the Boy Scouts consti-
tute a "business establishment" under the California statute,19 or a 
"public accommodation" under the New Jersey statute.20 The New 
Jersey court held that the BSA was subject to the state statute as a 
public accommodation, and therefore could not exclude on the basis 
of sexual orientation.21 The court further determined that subject-
ing BSA to the state anti-discrimination statute would not violate 
its members' freedom of association rights under the United States 
Constitution.22 By contrast, the California court held that the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act did not apply to the BSA, finding that it is 
not a business establishment, and thus the court did not address 
15. See ALLpORT, supra note 13, at 469 (citing as a frequently voiced view that 
"you cannot legislate against prejudice"). The legislative approach could "engender a 
contempt for law and a disregard for it" first, because people are unlikely to comply 
with such laws and second, because people consider such legislation to interfere too 
much with their "right to hate whom they choose." [d. at 470. 
16. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing the lower court 
decision in the Kansas case, which, in discussing the negative effects of segregation 
stated, "The impact is greater when [segregation] has the sanction of the law; for the 
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
[minority] group."); see also ALLPORT, supra note 13, at 469 (concluding that "we can be 
entirely sure that discriminative laws increase prejudice"); Eskridge, supra note 9, at 
2415 ("[I]n situations of direct clash [of rights] the state typically cannot remain neu-
tral ...• "). 
17. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998); Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999). 
18. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218; Curran, 952 P.2d at 238. 
19. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1999). This section is also known as the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act. See id. 
20. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1999). This section is also known as 
the Law Against Discrimination. See id. 
21. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218. 
22. See id. at 1222. 
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the constitutional issue.23 
While neither opinion discussed issues of state constitutional 
law, this Article examines the possibilities of using state constitu-
tionallaw to promote tolerance in society. Such an inquiry is rele-
vant because, unlike decisions by the United States Supreme Court, 
decisions by state courts do not apply to the entire nation, thus 
allowing state courts the opportunity "to face closer to home some 
fundamental values that the public has become accustomed to 
hav[ing] decided for them by the faraway oracles in the marble 
temple."24 This aspect may begin to address the possibility that 
tolerance can be advanced on smaller scales. Additionally, indepen-
dent analysis of state constitutions by the state courts may serve as 
laboratories for experimentation.25 States might employ a variety 
of approaches, perhaps moving away from the traditional dichoto-
mies26 employed by the United States Supreme Court and provide 
a fresh perspective on these issues. Furthermore, in terms of creat-
ing a theory of interpretation, the context involved in cases similar 
to Dale and Curran allows courts to eschew typical independent 
interpretations of state constitutions that place great reliance on 
23. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 238. Other courts have also considered whether the 
BSA falls within anti-discrimination statutes when the BSA denies membership to girls 
or women. See, e.g., Yeaw v. Boy Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that the BSA is not a "business establishment" pursuant to the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act), review dismissed, 960 P.2d 509 (Cal. 1998) (pending decision in 
Curran); Quinnipac Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Commission on Human Rights & 
Opportunities, 528 A2d 352, 357 (Conn. 1987) (BSA is not subject to state public accom-
modation law). For an example when BSA has denied membership or promotion to 
atheists, see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding 
the BSA is not a place of public accommodation for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 262 (Cal. 
1998) (finding the BSA is not subject to state civil rights statute.); Seabourn v. Coronado 
Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); see also Review & Outlook: 
Scouts' Honor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1999, at W11 (labeling the above challenges as 
attacks by "the Three G's: girls, gays and the godless"). 
24. Justice Hans A Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of 
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 395 (1980); see also Sanford Levinson, Freedom of 
Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property Under State Constitutional Law, in 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 51, 59-63 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985). 
25. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
26. See Martha Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1393, 1397 (1990) (suggesting "that we cannot assume that we know what to call things, 
and point[ing] to the phrase 'hate speech,' as a name that already decides how to char-
acterize, analyze, and treat the incidents" and further discussing the need to "dislodge 
the basic assumption that analysis depends on a series of either/or choices, founded on 
binary concepts" in the context of free speech claims). 
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how the language of the state constitution differs from the federal 
counterpart.27 The context of such cases allows courts to instead 
examine a variety of sources focusing on how to combat bias and 
prejudice as well as the particular problems confronting homosexu-
als, especially gay youths, who are the victims of intolerance.28 
Among the issues of state constitutional law, this Article will 
examine the rights of privacy, freedom of association, equal protec-
tion, as well as the requirement of state action in the context of 
cases like Dale and Curran. In addition, the Author suggests possi-
ble methods for reconciling rights that conflict as a result of inde-
pendent state constitutional interpretation. Part II discusses the 
Dale and Curran cases.29 Next, Part III summarizes current analy-
sis of these constitutional issues by the United States Supreme 
COurt,30 and examines the extent to which state courts have em-
ployed independent interpretations of their constitutions.3! Finally, 
Part IV discusses a variety of sources relevant to the conflict of 
rights involved and urges courts to look to such sources as part of 
their independent analysis in an effort to eschew the traditional 
dichotomies.32 
27. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., con-
curring) (listing seven criteria the court should use in applying a state constitution to 
protect individual rights). Most of these factors require a finding of a unique aspect of 
the state constitution, such as its text or history, or of the state itself, such as its 
traditions or matters of particular local concern. See id. But see Robert A. Schapiro, 
Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389 (1998) 
(questioning the value of searching for a distinct state identity). 
28. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 
HARv. L. REv. 1147, 1160 (1993) (criticizing the "doctrine of unique state sources" and 
urging state courts to consider instead "the widest possible [range of] sources" to pro-
mote national constitutional discourse). This approach is perhaps analogous to that used 
by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, in which the 
Court did not limit itself to the "tangible factors" tending to show equalization of white 
and black schools, and instead considered "the effect of segregation itself on public 
education." 347 U.S. at 492. 
29. See infra Part II. 
30. The reader might ask, why discuss the Federal Constitution in an article on 
state constitutional law? The area of state constitutional law is essentially a type of 
comparative law study, involving comparisons between state and federal jurisprudence, 
as well as comparisons among state interpretations. For this reason, analysis of federal 
interpretation is necessary to illustrate the extent to which state interpretation is inde-
pendent. 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
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II. THE DALE AND CURRAN CASES 
Dale and Curran contained similar facts. Both involved plain-
tiffs who had participated in the Boy Scouts for a significant period 
of time (Dale for ten years and Curran for four years), both plain-
tiffs had received numerous awards and honors as scouts, and both 
declared their homosexuality outside of any Boy Scouts function or 
context.33 BSA, however, had accepted Dale's application to be an 
Assistant Scoutmaster before he had declared his homosexuality, 
while Curran had applied to attend a BSA National Jamboree after 
he was featured in a newspaper series on gay teenagers.34 Dale's 
membership was revoked, and Curran's application was denied.35 
Both plaintiffs alleged that BSA violated state statutory discrimina-
tion laws, thus both courts had to determine whether such statutes 
applied to BSA.36 Finally, the anti-discrimination statutes in both 
states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.37 
In Dale, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the policy 
behind the Law Against Discrimination as well as a legislative 
mandate to interpret the statute broadly to determine that the law 
applied to the BSA.38 The statute itself states that "[d]iscrimina-
tion threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the in-
habitants of the state but menaces the institutions and foundation 
of a free democratic State. "39 In addition, the statute specifically 
states that it is to be "liberally construed. "40 Against this statutory 
33. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 220; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05. 
34. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 221; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204. 
35. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 221; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05. The facts in Curran 
on this point are a little more complicated. After Curran had been featured in a newspa-
per article on gay teenagers, the Executive Director of the Mt. Diablo Council deter-
mined that Curran was no longer active in the program. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 221. 
Later, Curran submitted his application to attend the Jamboree and was told that he 
was no longer registered as an active member and was therefore ineligible to attend. See 
id. When Curran stated that he would apply to be an active adult member, the director 
told him that BSA would not be able to accept such an application from him. See id. 
36. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 222; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205. 
37. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (protecting against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation by judicial fiat); N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-4 ("All persons shall have the 
opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations . . . without discrimination because 
of ... affectional or sexual orientation .... "). See, e.g., In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999 
(Cal. 1970) (concluding that a business owner may not arbitrarily exclude); Stoumen v. 
Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1951) (in dictum) (finding a restaurant owner may not 
exclude homosexuals without showing good cause). 
38. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208. 
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3. 
40.Id. 
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backdrop, as well as case law precedent, the court interpreted the 
term "place of accommodation" in a way that did not require an 
organization to have a fixed structural facility.41 The court also 
held that the BSA is a place of "public accommodation" based on 
the following factors: BSA engages in broad public solicitation for 
members, it maintains close relationships with the government and 
other public accommodations, and it is similar to other recognized 
public accommodations.42 
Since the court held that the public accommodation statute 
applied to the BSA, it had to address the constitutional defense 
raised by the BSA.43 The BSA argued that the First Amendment 
freedom of association protected its members from application of 
the Law Against Discrimination.44 The court relied on United 
States Supreme Court precedent in its analysis of the two strands 
of associational rights.45 First is the "intimate association" strand, 
which stems from the Court's rulings in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees46 and Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary 
Club of Duarte.47 The Jaycees and Rotary International, both pri-
vate clubs, denied regular membership to women.48 The clubs chal-
lenged state public accommodation laws forcing them to admit 
women, and argued that such application would violate the other 
members' First Amendment freedom of association right.49 The 
United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of rela-
tionships that "involve deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a 
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one's life."50 Thus, the Court fo-
cused on factors such as smallness, selectivity, and seclusion from 
others as the attributes that "reflect the considerations that have 
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic 
41. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1210. But see Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (holding that Con-
gress did not intend 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) "to include membership organizations that do 
not maintain a close connection to a structural facility"). 
42. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1210-13. 
43. See id. at 1219. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
47. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
48. See Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 541; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613. 
49. See Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 543; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616-17. 
50. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. 
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element of personalliberty."51 In both Roberts and Rotary Interna-
tional, the Court concluded that neither club satisfied the factors to 
show that the relationships among its members were "the kind of 
intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protec-
tion."52 The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts 
were comparable to the Jaycees and Rotary International.53 Since 
troop sizes vary from fifteen to thirty boys plus adult members, the 
court held that the smallness factor was not present.54 As to selec-
tivity, the court found that "any boy between the ages of eleven and 
seventeen can join," and similar to the facts in Rotary Internation-
al, the BSA "actively [sought] to interest as many boys as possi-
ble. "55 In addition, the court focused on the Boy Scouts' "commit-
ment to ensur[ing] that its membership is 'representative of all of 
the population.,"56 The court concluded that the nature of the rela-
tionship involved in a troop is not the type of intimate and private 
relationship which the First Amendment protects.57 
As to the second strand of freedom of association, the court 
analyzed whether forcing the Boy Scouts not to discriminate in 
their membership on the basis of sexual orientation would infringe 
on "expressive association" rights.58 The court looked to United 
States Supreme Court precedent that has explained that the Con-
stitution protects expressive association to allow individuals to 
combine their efforts to pursue other rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.59 The Court also stated that while "[fJreedom of asso-
ciation . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate[60] . . . 
[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, 
absolute."61 Rather, the Supreme Court, in both Roberts and Rota-
ry International, critically examined the expressive purpose assert-
ed by the clubs.62 In Roberts, the Court rejected the argument that 
51. [d. at 620. 
52. Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 546; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
53. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1220-21. 
54. See id. at 1221. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 1222. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. at 1222-28 (discussing "expressive association" rights). 
59. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1222 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622). 
60. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977». 
61. [d. 
62. Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 548-49 (discussing the purpose of Rotary Clubs); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23 (discussing the purpose of BSA). 
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forcing the Jaycees to grant women regular membership would 
alter or affect any speech based on the mere fact that under mem-
bership rules women are not allowed to vote.S3 
Similarly in Dale, the court critically examined the expressive 
association asserted by the Boy Scouts.64 The Boy Scouts claimed 
that its Law and Oath express its members' views on homosexuali-
ty.65 They pointed to the fact that the Boy Scout Law requires mem-
bers to be "clean."66 In addition, in the Boy Scout Oath each scout 
promises to "keep ... morally straight. »67 The court concluded that 
these words "do not, on their face, express anything about sexuali-
ty, much less that homosexuality, in particular, is immoral."66 In 
fact, in its discussion of the facts of the case, the court pointed out 
that the Scoutmaster Handbook instructs the leaders to refrain 
from discussing sex at all, stating that "boys should learn about sex 
and family life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual 
beliefs."69 The New Jersey court concluded that "Boy Scout mem-
bers do not associate to share the view that homosexuality is im-
moral," and therefore "Dale's expulsion constituted discrimination 
based solely on his status as an openly gay man. "70 In addition, 
the court distinguished the facts involved in Dale from those in 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group.71 In 
Hurley, the United States Supreme Court held that forcing private 
parade organizers to include a contingency of gay, lesbian and bi-
sexual descendants of Irish immigrants would "essentially requir[e] 
[the organizers] to alter the expressive content of their parade."72 
Notably, the Supreme Court was less scrutinizing of any message of 
63. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. However, Justice O'Connor suggested an alterna-
tive method of analysis in her concurring opinion. She asserted that state regulations be 
subject to rationality review when the organization affected is a commercial association. 
See id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, associations should be treated as 
commercial if its activities are not "predominantly of the type protected by the First 
Amendment." [d. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
64. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1222-28. 
65. See id. at 1223. 
66. Id. at 1224. It also requires them to be "trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, 
courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, ... and reverent." Id. at 1223. 
67. Id. at 1202. The entire Oath is: "I will do my best to do my duty to God and 
my country and to obey the Scout Law; to help other people at all times; to keep myself 
physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." Id. 
68. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1224. 
69. Id. at 1203 (quoting the Boy Scout Handbook). 
70. [d. at 1225. 
71. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
72. Id. at 572-73. 
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the parade than it had been of the asserted expressive association 
asserted by the private clubs in Roberts and Rotary Internation-
al.73 In fact, the state court, in Hurley, had found "that it was im-
possible to detect an expressive purpose in the parade. "74 N onethe-
less, the Supreme Court found that the very nature of a parade in-
dicates that the marchers "are making some sort of collective point, 
not just to each other but to bystanders along the way."76 By con-
trast, the BSA could not show that membership or leadership in the 
BSA constitutes "a form of 'pure speech' akin to a parade."76 Thus, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the distinction in Hurley 
that the nature of the conduct of the group was in fact expressive, 
while the same could not be said of the BSA or leadership in the 
BSA77 
The California Supreme Court in Curran held that the BSA is 
not subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act/8 which applies to "all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever."79 In contrast to 
the statutory analysis by the New Jersey court, the Curran court 
employed an unclear and somewhat tortuous consideration of the 
statute's meaning.50 The California court examined the legislative 
amendments to the statute in an attempt to establish the legisla-
tive intent.51 As originally enacted, the law applied to "places of 
public accommodation or amusement" and listed ten specific exam-
ples.52 In 1959, however, the legislature changed the statute to its 
current language. The court explained that this amendment was in 
73. See id. at 568-72 (discussing the First Amendment protection given to the 
message, or "collective point," that is made by a parade). But cf. Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. 
at 545-47 (holding that the club's "association" did not warrant constitutional protection); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-29 (noting acceptable limitations on a groups' rights to ex-
pressive association when there is a "legitimate" state purpose at issue). 
74. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 564 (discussing the fmdings and conclusions of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts). 
75. Id. at 568. 
76. Dale, 734 A2d at 1229. 
77. See id. 
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51. 
79. Id. 
80. See generally Curran, 952 P.2d 218. In a concurring opinion, Justice Mosk in-
dicates that the majority's analysis is flawed. See id. at 252 ("The m(\jority, however, do 
not engage in identical analysis [to Mosk's] - or, despite their many pages, in any 
substantial analysis as an alternative."). Mosk agreed with the result - Unruh does not 
apply to the BSA - but urged the court to overrule Isbister u. Boys' Club of Santa 
Cruz, 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985), and articulate a clear standard for the term "business 
establishment." See id. (Mosk, J., concurring). 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
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response to appellate court opinions that held that the statute did 
not apply to a private cemetery, a dentist's office and to a private 
school. 83 Further, the court stated that the legislature "under-
took ... to revise and expand the scope of the then-existing version 
of section 51."84 Despite acknowledgment of the legislative goal to 
broaden the application of Unruh, the court in Curran concluded 
that the Act does not apply to the BSA.85 The court struggled to 
distinguish the Boy Scouts from the Boys' Club, to which the court 
had applied the Unruh Civil Rights Act.86 In Isbister v. Boys' Club 
of Santa Cruz,87 the California Supreme Court relied on the 
legislature's intent to expand the scope of Unruh to hold that the 
Act applied to the membership policies of a charitable organization 
"if the entity's attributes and activities demonstrate that it is the 
functional equivalent of a classic 'place[] of public accommodation or 
amusement.,"8S Thus the court in Isbister essentially relied on the 
statutory language of Unruh before its amendment in 1959.89 The 
majority in Curran endorsed this legislative intent analysis, but 
concluded that the Boy Scouts differ from the Boys' Club.90 Inter-
estingly, the court did not consider relevant to its legislative intent 
analysis the fact that attempts by some legislators to specifically 
exempt the Boy Scouts from the Unruh Act failed passage in com-
mittee,91 even though such attempts were in direct response to the 
83. See id. (citing Reed v. Hollywood Prof! School, 338 P.2d 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959); Coleman v. Middlestaft', 305 P.2d 1020 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Long v. Mountain 
View Cemetery Ass'n, 278 P.2d 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955». 
84. Curran, 952 P.2d at 229 
85. See id. at 239. 
86. See id. at 232-33 (emphasizing the narrow scope of the Isbister holding). Jus-
tice Mosk also criticizes the majority for doing "little more than attempt[ing] to distin-
guish Isbister." Id. at 252 (Mosk, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
87. 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985). 
88. Curran, 952 P.2d at 236 (quoting Isbister, 707 P.2d at 216 (alteration in 
original). 
89. See id. at 249-50 (Mosk, J., concurring) (criticizing the Isbister majority for 
applying language in the original version of the Unruh Act rather than the current 
version). 
90. See id. at 238. 
91. S~e id. at 228 n.12 ("[T]he Legislature's failure to enact the proposed bills . . . 
cannot properly be viewed as a legislative resolution of the issue now before us."). In 
addition, a further attempt to exempt the Boy Scouts was made after the California 
Supreme Court's decision; this too failed in committee. See S.B. 1910, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal.) The proposed amendment stated "'business establishment' . . . does not include 
any voluntary association or not-for-profit organization if the primary activities of the 
association or organization are programs for minors." Id. These exempt associations and 
organizations include, but are not limited to, the Boy Scouts of America. See id. 
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decision from the lower COurt.92 
The court also justified its holding on the grounds that the BSA 
is a "charitable, expressive, and social organization . . . whose for-
mation and activities are unrelated to the promotion or ad-
vancement of the economic or business interests of its members. "93 
Since the Boys' Club is also non-profit and a social organization, the 
expressive nature of the Boy Scouts seemed to be of greater signifi-
cance to the COurt.94 In fact, the court elaborates on the "expres-
sive" aspect of the Boy Scouts based on the court's conclusion that 
its "primary function is the inculcation of values in its youth mem-
bers."95 The court's reliance on the BSA's expressive aspect is very 
similar to the analysis used to determine whether subjecting the 
entity to the statute would violate the First Amendment protection 
of freedom of association.96 Thus, the court seemed to consider the 
first amendment defense within the question of whether the BSA 
constitutes a business establishment, and relied on any expressive 
aspect to support the holding that the BSA is not a business estab-
lishment.97 
The methods of analysis used by the courts in both Curran and 
Dale reflect the traditional public/private dichotomy involved in the 
interpretation of public accommodation statutes regarding their 
scope as well as in the context of evaluating the constitutional de-
fense of freedom of association.9s The following section summarizes 
the traditional analyses in the context of several constitutional 
issues and suggests how state courts might employ their own con-
stitutions to develop new theories of interpretation that break away 
from the bin~9 method of analysis. 
92. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding that Curran had stated a cause of action under Unruh), affd, 952 P.2d 218 
(Cal. 1998). 
93. Curran, 952 P.2d at 236. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. at 238. 
96. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text. 
97. In fact, concurring Justice Kennard focused on this constitutional question so as 
to avoid any detailed analysis of the application of the statute. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 
254-56 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
98. See generally Curran, 952 P.2d 218 (interpreting the Unruh Civil Rights Act to 
find that BSA is not a "business establishment" under the Act). But cf. Dale, 734 A.2d 
1196 (interpreting New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination to find that BSA is a "place 
of public accommodation"}. 
99. See Minow, supra note 26, at 1397; Myhra, supra note 5, at 79-80 & n.39 
(arguing that an "expansive view of the people who potentially may suffer iDjury [from 
hateful speech is] indispensable in considering how to respond to hate incidents"). 
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Ill. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES 
Both California and New Jersey have well developed histories 
of interpreting and applying their state constitutions independently 
of United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Con-
stitution. lOo Nonetheless, neither the Curran nor Dale courts dis-
cussed state constitutional law issues.10l There may be several 
reasons for this. The parties may not have raised state constitu-
tional law issues;lo2 perhaps because both states have anti-dis-
crimination statutory provisions that prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. loa The lawyers representing Dale and 
Curran may have decided that it was unnecessary to raise an equal 
protection claim. As to the constitutional defense of freedom of 
association raised by the BSA,104 the lawyers may have thought 
that the precedent of the United States Supreme Court adequately 
protected their rights and that the New Jersey Constitution would 
not have provided any greater protections. In addition, when a 
state court relies on its state constitution, the court often, but cer-
tainly not always,105 interprets the document in a way that is 
more protective of rights. Since the New Jersey court found that ap-
plication of its Law Against Discrimination did not violate the 
rights of the BSA, it limited its analysis to the federal Constitution; 
100. See generally Wesley L. Lanee, Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the New 
Jersey Constitution, The 1947 Constitution: A Retrospective, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
817 (1997); Stewart G. Pollock, Celebrating Fifty Years of Judicial Reform Under the 
1947 New Jersey Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 6735 (1998); California Constitutional 
Symposium, 17 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1989); Jeffrey White, Note, State Constitutional 
Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Fed-
eralism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737, 740 (1976) (describing the California Supreme Court 
as "the birthplace of th[e] new judicial independence"). 
101. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 219. Though the court never reached the constitutional 
issues, they questioned whether application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act would violate 
BSA's rights "under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution." 
[d. (emphasis added). The Dale court also framed the issue around BSA's First Amend-
ment rights under the federal constitution. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1200. 
102. See State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring) (warn-
ing that "[a]ny defense lawyer who fails to raise an Oregon Constitution violation and 
relies solely on parallel provisions under the federal constitution . . . should be guilty of 
legal malpractice," yet criticizing the majority opinion's reliance on the state constitution 
to reject United States Supreme Court's precedent); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Consti-
tutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV. 199, 224 (1998) (explaining the 
importance of raising state constitutional claims). 
103. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -49. 
104. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219-28. 
105. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 725 P.2d 894, 895 (Or. 1986) (holding that the Oregon 
Constitution does not require Miranda-type warnings). 
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the court was not looking to broaden rights, and thus an analysis of 
the state constitution was not necessary. lOG This section briefly ex-
plains the jurisprudence of constitutional issues involved under 
both state and federal constitutions. 
A. Equal Protection 
There are several methods of analysis by which courts may 
extend equal protection rights to homosexuals.107 The main ave-
nues are for a court to determine that homosexuals are a "suspect 
class" or that a fundamental right is at stake. lOS Under either type 
of analysis, the court then subjects the law or form of discrimina-
tion to strict scrutiny.109 "Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal 
to the challenged law."110 Alternatively, a court would simply ex-
amine the statute applying a rational basis test to any non-suspect 
classification.111 In contrast to the typical result when the court 
applies strict scrutiny, "[t]he rational basis test is enormously defer-
ential to the government and only rarely have laws been declared 
unconstitutional [under] this level of review."1l2 The following ex-
amples reflect each of these approaches. 
The United States Supreme Court recently found protection 
against unequal treatment for homosexuals in a limited context. In 
Romer v. Evans,1l3 the Court found that a voter-initiated 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2), which 
repealed state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of homo-
sexuality, was unconstitutional.1l4 The Court's finding that the 
106. See Van Cleave, supra note 102, at 209-14 (discussing certain methods of state 
constitutional interpretation that are susceptible to the criticism of being "result·orient· 
ed"). 
107. For a more detailed discussion of equality for homosexuals, see Eskridge, supra 
note 9; Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989). 
108. See Halley, supra note 107, at 920-21 (discussing treating homosexuals as a 
"suspect class"); see also Bernstein, supra note 9, at 269 (noting the strengths and 
weaknesses of "suspect class" and fundamental right arguments). 
109. See generally Bernstein, supra note 9, at 269. Because courts have generally 
rejected the "suspect class" analysis with respect to sexual orientation, Bernstein argues 
that claiming denial of a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection clause would 
provide the same heightened judicial scrutiny. See id. 
110. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 529 
(1997). 
111. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 293. 
112. CHElI1ERINSKY, supra note 110, at 530. 
113. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
114. See id. at 636. 
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amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not based on a determination that homosexuals 
constitute a suspect class, U5 but on the grounds that Amendment 
2 imposed a "disability on a single named group" and lacked a "ra-
tional relationship to legitimate state interests."U6 Thus, the 
Court applied a rational basis test and found that Amendment 2 
failed.u7 While the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately reached 
the same result, it did so by holding that the fundamental right to 
participate equally in the political process required application of 
strict scrutiny. us Of course, the Colorado court considered only 
the Federal Constitution because Amendment 2 was itself part of 
the state constitution. ll9 Neither approach taken by the Colorado 
and United States Supreme Courts involved treating homosexuals 
as a suspect class. Justice Brennan, however, has written that 
"homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this 
country's population."120 In his opinion dissenting from a denial of 
115. One commentator has argued that gay rights might be better furthered in 
federal courts if equal protection claims are based on fundamental rights rather than 
suspect classification in order to "suppl[y] the courts with a route to heightened scruti-
ny." Bernstein, supra note 9, at 293. 
116. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
117. See id. This approach is in contrast to that used by the Court 10 years earlier 
in Bowers v. Hardwiek, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the Court upheld a criminal sodomy 
law. In Bowers, the Court applied a Due Process analysis and found that no fundamen-
tal liberty was involved because a right to engage in consensual sodomy is not "deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," nor is it "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 
(1937), and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977»; see also Janet E. Halley, 
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. 
REv. 1721, 1745-47 (1993) (examining the conduct/status dichotomy); Kendall Thomas, 
The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1805 (1993). 
118. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993), affd, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
119. Typically, states that employ the voter initiative method of constitutional 
change have rather narrow bases for invalidating such amendments. For example, in 
California, a court may invalidate a voter-initiated constitutional change if the amend-
ment encompasses more than a "single subject" or if it constitutes a constitutional 
revision rather than an amendment. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Con-
flict: The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 129-30 (1993). The California Supreme Court has applied 
both of these limitations sparingly, invalidating few voter-initiated constitutional changes. 
See id. 
120. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Watkins v. United States Army, 875 
F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "because homosexuals have historically been 
subject to invidious discrimination, laws which burden homosexuals as a class should be 
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certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,121 Jus-
tice Brennan pointed to the fact that "the immediate and severe 
opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals ... [makes] 
members of this group particularly powerless to pursue their rights 
openly in the political arena."122 This analysis, however, has not 
yet been adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Both the 
Supreme Court and Brennan focus on the either/or question of 
whether homosexuals constitute a protected or suspect class, and 
neither address the question of when the state may and may not 
treat certain groups of individuals differently from other 
groups. 123 
State courts have also fallen prey to this dichotomous reason-
ing. In interpreting their own constitutions, state courts have held 
that equal protection provisions extend to homosexuals, albeit in a 
sometimes circuitous fashion. For example, in Baehr v. Lewin,124 
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that sex is a "suspect category" 
under the Hawaii Constitution, based on the fact that the state 
constitution, in contrast to the Federal Constitution, expressly in-
cludes "sex" in its equal rights provision.l25 The court thus held 
that the state marriage statute, which limited the granting of mar-
riage licenses to opposite-sex couples, must be subjected to strict 
scrutiny.126 Although in Baehr the classification was subject to 
strict scrutiny, the discrimination was based on "sex" rather than 
sexual orientation,127 thus somewhat limiting the potential for re-
lying on this case in other contexts relating to equal protection 
rights for homosexuals. By contrast, in Gay Law Students Ass'n v. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 128 the California Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that its state equal protection provision protects 
subjected to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause" and thus distinguish-
ing the court's Equal Protection analysis from the Due Process analysis used in Bowers). 
121. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). 
122. Id. at 1014. 
123. See id. at 1009. 
124. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
125. See id. at 60, 67. The court, however, expressly stated that its "holding in this 
regard is not ... [t]hat Appellants are a suspect class." Id. at 67 n.33 (distinguishing 
its opinion from the dissent). Nonetheless, the opinion represents greater protection for 
homosexuals than afforded under the federal Constitution. 
126. See id. at 67. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintifl's 
complaint and remanded. See id. at 68. For a description of subsequent proceedings, see 
Eckols, supra note 11, at 387-88. 
127. See Baeher, 852 P.2d at 60. 
128. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
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against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.129 Appli-
cation of strict scrutiny, however, depends on a finding of a suspect 
classification. In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administra-
tion,13o the court held that a denial of dental benefits to unmar-
ried partners of homosexual state employees did not establish any 
classification and thus did not violate the equal protection clause of 
the California Constitution.13l Therefore, in California, while the 
state equal protection clause protects against discrimination on the 
. basis of sexual orientation, such discrimination is not subject to 
strict scrutiny, but rather a less demanding form of review, unless 
there is a specific classification singling out homosexuals.132 
State courts have an opportunity to examine whether their 
constitutions protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Similar to the analysis used by Justice Brennan in 
Rowland, state courts might be able to point to the fact that in 
1997, 13.94% of bias-motivated offenses were based on the victim's 
sexual orientation. l33 This statistic would imply that homosexuals 
are an "insular minority" requiring state constitutional protection. 
While the federal courts might be hostile to such arguments,134 
state courts might be more receptive. Aside from looking to statis-
tics and other sources, a state court might rely on the language of 
its state constitution as a basis for concluding that homosexuals 
constitute an "insular minority." For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Wasson/35 the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down a criminal 
sodomy law in part because the law violated the state constitution's 
equal protection provision.13s The court relied on the more expan-
129. See id. at 597 ("[T]his general constitutional principle [that the state equal 
protection clause forbids the state from "arbitrarily discriminating against any class of 
individuals in employment decisions"] applies to homosexuals as well as to all other 
members of our polity."). 
130. 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
131. See id. at 416. 
132. Cf. Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112, 126-27 (Mont. 1997) (Turnage, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that rather than strike the criminal sodomy law on the grounds 
that it violates the right to privacy, the court should have relied on equal protection 
analysis and found that the classification had no rational basis, even though the statute 
specifically singled out sexual intercourse between two persons of the same sex). 
133. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME 
REpORTS 60-61 (1997). 
134. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 278; Thomas B. Stoddard, Lesbian and Gay 
Rights Litigation Before a Hostile Federal Judiciary: Extracting Benefit from Peril, 27 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 555, 558 (1992). 
135. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). 
136. See id. at 500. 
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sive language of the state provision,137 as compared to the federal 
counterpart, 138 and concluded that "[a]ll are entitled to equal 
treatment, unless there is a substantial governmental interest, a 
rational basis, for different treatment."139 The court went on to 
critically examine the justifications for the separate classification 
and rejected them as "simply outrageous."140 Thus, although the 
court employed language indicating that it was using a rational 
basis test,141 it actually scrutinized the governmental purpose 
carefully. In Wasson, the court appeared to be less concerned with 
the traditional dichotomy of whether or not a suspect class was 
before them, than with the legitimacy of the governmental interests 
used to justify treating anyone differently. The Wasson court's dis-
cussion of the right to privacy, discussed below, represents an even 
better example of moving away from either/or questions and how to 
consider a variety of sources. 
B. Privacy 
Another avenue for advancing homosexual rights has been 
reliance on a right of privacy in order to defeat state laws 
criminalizing sodomy.142 In Bowers v. Hardwick/43 the Supreme 
Court did not discuss a right to privacy, but folded this claim into 
its discussion of the due process argument.144 Like the United 
137. "All men, when they form a social compact, are equal," and "absolute and arbi-
trary power over the lives, liberty and property of free men exists nowhere in a repub-
lic, not even in the largest majority." Ky. CONST. §§ 2-3; see also John Devlin, Con-
structing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights 
Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 839-41 (1990) (dis-
cussing state equality provisions in the context of analyzing whether state action is 
required under state constitutions). See generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guaran-
tees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195 (1985) (discussing the variety of 
language used in state constitutions to secure equality). 
138. "[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
139. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500. 
140. Id. at 501. 
141. See id. at 500. 
142. For further discussion of this issue, see Ron Buckmire, Narrative and Jurispru-
dence in State Courts: The Example of Constitutional Challenges to Sex Conduct Regula-
tion, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1633 (1997); Nan Feyler, The Use of the State Constitutional Right 
to Privacy to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 973 (1986). 
143. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
144. See id. at 191-92. In contrast to the mltiority's focus on whether there is a 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the dissent stated that the real issue in the case 
is about "the right to be let alone." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 
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States Constitution, the Kentucky Constitution does not contain an 
express right of privacy. Nonetheless, the court in Wasson deter-
mined that the state constitution protects such a right.145 In sup-
port of its conclusion, the court relied in part on a theory typical of 
independent interpretation.146 The court looked to the history of 
the Kentucky Constitution, as well as to the text of the constitu-
tion, which differed from the United States Constitution, to support 
a right of privacy violated by the state sodomy law violated.147 
The court employed another of Justice Handler's criterion in exam-
ining the debates surrounding the Kentucky Constitution to find 
that it "express[es] protection of individual liberties significantly 
greater than the selective list of rights addressed by the Federal 
Bill of Rights."148 The court, however, supplemented this tradi-
tional method of state constitutional analysis with citations to non-
legal sources such as John Stuart Mill, a nineteenth century econo-
mist and philosopher.149 In fact, Wasson is cited by commentator 
Kahn as an example of a state court relying on more than simply 
the uniqueness of the state or the state constitution.150 
Aside from analysis of the right of privacy in the specific con-
text of litigation/51 this Article queries whether it might be possi-
ble for state courts to consider other aspects of privacy impacted by 
allowing the Boy Scouts to exclude individuals on the basis of sexu-
al orientation. For example, masked by the legal facts set out in the 
opinion of Bowers, is the story told by Michael Hardwick in which 
he recounts the events leading up to his arrest for violation of the 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
145. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 492. 
146. See id. at 492-99. 
147. See id. 
148. [d. at 494. 
149. See id. at 496 (citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386 (Ky. 1909) 
(quoting at length John Stuart Mill's ON LIBERTY». 
150. See Kahn, supra note 28, at 1153 n.25. 
151. Other examples of state courts relying on their state constitution to overturn 
sodomy laws include Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121-22 (Mont. 1997) (relying on an 
express provision protecting the right to privacy in Declaration of Rights in Montana's 
constitution to subject the statute to strict scrutiny) and Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 
S.W.2d 250, 260-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the Homosexual Practices Act uncon-
stitutional based on state's constitution). The right of privacy also arose in the context of 
same-gender marriage. The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the argument using an anal-
ysis similar to the United States Supreme Court in Bowers: The right to a same-sex 
marriage is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57; see 
also Eckols, supra note 11, at 383-93 (describing considerations of the right to privacy 
and same-gender marriage by other state courts). 
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sodomy law, and reveals a specific effort by the officer involved162 
to "search out and expose homosexuals."163 Similarly, the facts in 
Wasson illustrate how the mere existence of the law against sodomy 
prompted the police to orchestrate an undercover operation164 for 
the purpose of "lur[ing] homosexuals into violations of law."165 In 
addition to how this reflects on law enforcement and allocation of 
resources,156 this type of activity also raises concerns about the 
pursuit of individuals based on sexual orientation, which is very 
similar to the witch hunts that have followed the military's "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy regarding homosexuals.157 
The Web site for Servicemembers Legal Defense Network 
(SLDN) documents numerous invasions of privacy in furtherance of 
an attempt to ferret out homosexuals in the military.15B In addi-
tion to invasions of privacy, service members who have complained 
about harassment they have suffered have themselves been the 
focus of investigations.159 Rather than "live[] in constant fear of 
being 'found out'" many qualified service members have re-
signed.l60 
152. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEm CONVICTIONS 392-97 (1988). 
153. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2425 (describing efforts by state and federal govern-
ments in the 1950s to regulate homosexual activity and referring to Bowers as the last 
in line of court decisions criminalizing defendants for their deviant sexual activity). 
154. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 488. 
155. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2425. 
156. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Ouercriminalization, 374 THE ANNALS 157 
(1967), reprinted in THE CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 165 
(Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 6th ed. 1995) ("To obtain evidence, [of 
consensual homosexual conduct] police are obliged to resort to behavior which tends to 
degrade and demean both themselves personally and law enforcement as an institu-
tion."); see also Bielicki v. Superior Court, 371 P.2d 288, 289 (Cal. 1962) (describing how 
a police officer used a pipe running through the ceiling to observe homosexual conduct 
inside a fully-enclosed stall of a pay toilet). 
157. See Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, Conduct Unbecoming: The Fifth 
Annual Report on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" (Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www. 
sldn.orglreportslfifthl> [hereinafter Conduct Unbecoming]. 
158. See Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, The Sole National Legal Aid and 
Watchdog Organization That Assists Seroicemembers Hurt By the Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 
Don't Pursue Policy (last modified Aug. 31, 1999) <http://www.sldn.org> (describing, for 
example, how a Navy psychiatrist turned in a corporeal after he asked a question about 
homosexuality, and how a Cadet's diary and three years worth of e-mail messages were 
seized to support allegations that she was a lesbian). 
159. See id. (noting that a private was accused of being a lesbian after reporting 
that she was nearly raped). 
160. Jill Szymanski, A Disseroice to Those Seroing Honorably, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRm., Mar. 19, 1999, at B-ll. In 1998, 414 people were dismissed from the Air Force 
due to their homosexuality. See Air Force Witch Hunt, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 
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based on equal protection or right of privacy grounds. State action 
involves "the essential dichotomy . . . between deprivation by the 
State, subject to [constitutional] scrutiny under its provisions, and 
private conduct... against which the Fourteenth Amendment 
offers no shield."165 Thus, the binary of private action/state action 
is entrenched in the traditional analysis of the state action require-
ment. A number of state courts have determined that their state 
constitutions do not require the analysis used by the United States 
Supreme Court and have thus applied state constitutional provi-
sions to entities that the United States Supreme Court would ex-
empt.166 The principal methods used by state courts are those 
listed in Justice Handler's opinion in State v. Hunt. 167 For exam-
ple, in finding that the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution applied to the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (PT&T), the California Supreme Court relied on the textual 
differences between the state provision and the parallel federal 
provision.166 Specifically, the court concluded that the California 
Constitution "contains no such explicit 'state action' require-
ment."169 Despite the lack of an express state action requirement, 
the court fell into the trap of binary analysis and simply expanded 
the definition of state action.170 The court concluded that the state 
equal protection provision applied to PT&T based on the company's 
status as "a privately owned public utility, which enjoys a state-pro-
tected monopoly or quasi-monopoly."171 In a later case, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, employing the same dichotomy, determined 
that the state constitutional right of privacy "creates a right of 
action against private as well as government entities."172 Again, 
using traditional methods of state constitutional interpretation, the 
court relied first on the fact that the California Constitution con-
tains an express right of privacy,173 and second on the arguments 
165. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 387 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974». 
166. See infra notes 168-81. 
167. 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982); see also supra note 27. 
168. See Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 598. 
169. Id. at 598. The California provision states, "A person may not be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the 
laws." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). By contrast, the federal provision declares, "Nor shall 
any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
170. See Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 599. 
171. Id. at 598-99. 
172. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). 
173. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
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This Article does not contend that the Boy Scouts are engaging 
in tactics similar to those used by the military to find and dismiss 
homosexuals. It is nonetheless important to raise the point that if 
the law allows BSA to exclude homosexuals, a possibility exists that 
the BSA or its members will attempt to actively identify homosexu-
als and to use ways that may impact on the privacy rights of such 
individuals. Dale's and Curran's statements revealing their homo-
sexuality were both published in newspapers.161 Chuck Merino, 
founder and former leader of a Boy Scout Explorer Troop, however, 
was dismissed by the Boy Scouts after he spoke at a community 
meeting and revealed his homosexuality.162 One commentator not-
ed, "How word of Merino's low-key comment got to the Scouting 
hierarchy is unclear. But without so much as questioning him, the 
Scouts sent a letter to Merino immediately banning him from any 
role with the Explorers. "163 Consistent with the approach that 
courts should consider a variety of sources in deciding how to inter-
pret state constitutions, it is important for courts to understand the 
potential impact of a decision involving the exclusion of homosexu-
als. This is especially true where permission to exclude may encour-
age infringements on individual privacy similar to the effect the 
military's policy on gays has had.l64 
C. State Action 
The doctrine of state action provides a major hurdle to raising 
state constitutional claims against BSA's exclusion of homosexuals 
1999, at B6. In 1997, SLDN documented 563 violations of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" 
policy. See Andrew Sullivan, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy Showing Grim Results, Hous. 
CHRON., Apr. 20, 1998, at Al9. SLDN also documented over 400 incidents of anti-gay ha-
rassment in 1998, an increase of 120% over the prior year. See Conduct Unbecoming, 
supra note 157. 
161. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 220-21; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05. 
162. Merino's story is recounted in Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and 
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in 
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 3, 101 n.274 (1995). 
163. [d. (citing Tony Perry, Landmark Case Pits Gay Officer Against Boy Scouts, 
LA TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A24). 
164. A possible rejoinder to this statement is that courts should consider that a 
prohibition on exclusion may discourage the beneficial activity of forming Boy Scout 
groups. However, such an argument lacks any support, unlike the support provided by 
the effect of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Analogously, the court's holding in 
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting), reproduced in 
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 20-24 (3d ed. 1993), did not discourage 
people from hunting foxes as predicted by the dissent. 
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contained in the ballot pamphlet of the election in which the 
amendment was approved.174 While the court held that the right 
of privacy did not include a state action requirement, the court 
nonetheless recognized and perpetuated the dichotomy, but deter-
mined that the unique aspects of the California Constitution dictat-
ed a different result as to privacy rights.175 
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that its 
state constitution is not limited to federal precedent.176 In New 
Jersey v. Schmid,177 the court concluded that the state constitu-
tional protection of free speech does not require "state action" such 
that a private university could not prohibit the distribution of po-
litical leaflets on its grounds.178 Initially, the method of analysis 
was typical. The court relied on the more expansive language in the 
state constitution,179 and on the fact that this provision was mod-
eled on other state constitutions, to determine that the state action 
requirement was less restrictive than under the Federal Constitu-
tion.lSO However, the court in Schmid then set out a standard that 
moved away from the customary binary analysis and instead set 
out factors by which the court could balance the competing interests 
of free speech and private property rights. lSl Thus, while the New 
Among these [is] ... privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
174. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 648-49. 
175. See id. at 656-57. The Texas Supreme Court employed a similar method of 
analysis, but had a different result in Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 
1997), where the court held that conduct by the Republican Party of Texas (RPT) did 
not amount to state action. See id. at 92. Specifically, the court held that when RPT 
denied the Log Cabin Republicans of Texas (LCR), who support equal rights for gay and 
lesbian individuals, a booth at the Republican Convention, no constitutional violation oc-
curred because the RPT is not a state actor. See id. at 92-93. The Texas Supreme Court 
examined the text and history of the Texas Constitution, which protected only against 
state actors. See id. at 91. The court further held that no state action was involved in 
this case after considering federal precedent. See id. at 92. But see id. at 95 (Spector, J., 
concurring) (pointing out that the majority failed to recognize the reasons for the federal 
state action requirement, namely the concerns "of federalism and separation of powers 
within the federal government" and suggesting that those issues may not be present in 
the context of a state constitutional protection). 
176. See New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 629-30 (N.J. 1980). 
177. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). 
178. See id. at 633. 
179. Compare N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6 ("Every person may freely speak, write and 
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No 
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."), with 
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press."). 
180. See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 627-28. 
181. See id. at 630. The considerations listed by the court are: 
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Jersey court used a typical method of examining its constitution, it 
sought to expound a theory of state action in the context of free 
speech that avoided the traditional dichotomies. 
The state action requirement in the context of a constitutional 
challenge to the BSA's exclusion of homosexuals can work to give 
the BSA an automatic advantage, even though such a case would 
involve a clash of constitutional norms.182 Where an individual 
claims an equal protection or right of privacy violation, both of 
which are constitutionally protected/83 and the BSA responds 
with a constitutional defense of freedom of association, the tradi-
tionally narrow view of state action would likely result in a explicit 
holding that no state actor has infringed on the individual's right to 
equal protection or privacy, and an implicit finding that to hold 
otherwise would impinge on the constitutional rights of BSA mem-
bers, which would involve the state. That is, forcing BSA not to dis-
criminate against homosexuals would violate its members' rights of 
freedom of association, and no one would doubt that state action 
was present. Yet this requirement is not present when the law 
allows BSA to exclude such individuals. Thus, the doctrine of state 
action fails to take into account any possibility that the state has 
acted when it "render[s] one group triumphant. »184 My point in 
(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, 
its 'normal' use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that 
property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such 
property in relation to both the private and public use of the property. 
[d. The court applied this standard in an effort to "continue to explore the extent of our 
State Constitutional right of free speech." New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the 
Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 771 (N.J. 1994). 
182. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2415. 
183. However, Erwin Chemerinsky points out that "[iJn a sense, to speak of private 
parties infringing constitutional rights begs the critical question of whether such rights 
exist against private infringements." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 389 n.17. 
Chemerinsky also comments in the text of his book: "The point here is that these are 
values widely accepted as important throughout society and the state action doctrine 
means that the Constitution does not limit their private infringement." [d. 
184. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2415 n.16 (discussing in the context of conflicts 
between religious and gay groups, criticizing the approach that requires one group to 
win while the other loses and suggesting that "courts can create structures and proce-
dures of cooperation that are law-sustaining"); see also Julian N. Eule, as completed by 
Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With 
Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1545 (1998) ("[SJome form of 
state action is nearly always present."); Harold W. Horowitz & Kenneth L. Karst, 
Reitman v. Mulky: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 
55 ("[T]he state can be said to authorize all conduct that it does not prohibit . . . . ")j 
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 445 ("Although the origin of state action is textual, counter-
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criticizing the state action requirement is not to advocate for its 
abolition,l85 but rather to suggest that state courts might rely on 
other sources to define the parameters of state action,186 in an ef-
fort to escape the "traditional, bipolar conceptualization"187 of the 
public/private distinction.18s Commentator John Devlin has pro-
posed a theory for state constitutions that largely eschews the pub-
lic/private dichotomy.189 Devlin's proposal carves out "zones of per-
sonal autonomy" that are to remain free from applications of consti-
tutional guarantees.190 This proposal would allow broader applica-
tion of constitutional norms than the traditional state action re-
quirement. However, even Devlin's proposal suffers from the defect 
of creating another dichotomy. His proposal specifies that state 
courts, in expanding the application of constitutional rights, should 
limit such expansions "only [to] the most important and fundamen-
tal state constitutional rights," and further that courts should bind 
private actors if rights "are violated in some important respect."191 
While the second half of this limitation would have to be deter-
mined in the context of the facts of the case, the first aspect, focus-
ing on fundamental rights, would require courts to establish a hi-
erarchy of rights, which could well depend upon how the court de-
fines the right. In Bowers, for example, the United States Supreme 
Court simply framed the right as the right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy to avoid a serious analysis of the privacy concerns in-
vailing values of privacy, freedom of association, and free speech all have been used to 
justify the rule's exculpation of private racism."). 
185. See Eule, supra note 184, at 1544-45. As the title suggests, the author urges 
caution regarding the emerging trend of imposing constitutional norms on private indi-
viduals and entities. See id. at 1537. 
186. See Devlin, supra note 137, at 885-86 (proposing the following factors for an 
alternative approach: that state constitutional rights be imposed on private actors only to 
the extent such actors are "wielding impersonal power," that "only the most important 
and fundamental state constitutional rights" be so imposed, and that state courts balance 
the competing interests rather than view the plaintiffs rights "in a vacuum"). 
187. Myhra, supra note 5, at 80 n.39. 
188. For additional criticisms of the public/private debate, see Charles L. Black, Jr., 
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and 
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (describing state action 
jurisprudence as a "conceptual disaster area"); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading 
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 209 
(1957) (suggesting the futility of a meaningful distinction between private and state 
action); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1351 (1982). 
189. See Devlin, supra note 137, at 884. 
190. [d. at 885. 
191. [d. 
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volved.192 The third factor in Devlin's proposal involves a balanc-
ing of the competing rights.193 This aspect of the proposal would 
require courts to focus on the "underlying issue" involved in such 
cases.194 Part IV of this Article suggests additional types of infor-
mation state courts might consider when balancing the competing 
rights. 
Iv. CONCLUSION: SOURCES TO SUPPORT 
DEPARTURES FROM THE TRADITIONAL DICHOTOMIES 
The discussion in this Article has revolved around the notion 
that independent interpretation of state constitutions offers an 
opportunity for state courts to avoid the narrowing effect that tradi-
tional either/or choices have on analyses of competing claims. In 
addition, this Article has suggested at several points that state 
courts might give greater legitimacy to their new and fresh theories 
by looking to so:urces beyond the different textual or historical as-
pects of their constitutions, or other examples of state uniqueness. 
In the context of BSA's exclusion of homosexuals and the competing 
claims involved, state courts should consider the developments in 
the theory of "intergroup contact, "195 which suggests a possibility 
for reducing prejudice. In addition, courts should generally consider 
the unique concerns confronting homosexuals and gay youth in 
particular. 
Justice Handler's concurring opinion in Dale reflects refreshing 
sensitivity to some of the issues specific to homosexuals. First, he 
recognized the "confluence of status and expression when both re-
late to the speaker's sexual orientation."196 He cited law review 
articles that argue when homosexuals "come out" they do more 
than simply speak, they also reveal their identity.197 Justice Han-
192. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
193. See Devlin, supra note 137, at 886. 
194. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 446 (referring to Frank Michelman, Conceptions of 
DeTTUJcracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 
TENN. L. REv. 291, 306 (1989». 
195. ALLPORT, supra note 13, at 281. 
196. Dale, 734 A2d at 1238 (Handler, J., concurring); see also Eckols, supra note 11, 
at 379-82 (discussing homosexual identity in the context of same-sex marriage). 
197. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1238 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Brian C. Murchison, 
Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 468 (1998) ("Self-
realization .. _ is what speech (including expressive activity) makes possible."); Nan D. 
Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1718 (1993) ("Self-identify-
ing speech does not merely reflect or communicate one's identity; it is a mlijor factor in 
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dler even quoted the ACT UP slogan, "I am out, therefore I 
am."198 In addition, Justice Handler considered social science 
sources to dismiss, as based on groundless stereotypes, BSA's asser-
tions that exclusion of homosexuals was consistent with its purpose 
of encouraging the moral development of its members199 and to 
counter the myth that homosexuals are more likely to molest chil-
dren.200 In addition to dismissing the stereotypes raised by BSA, 
Justice Handler used these sources to bolster the New Jersey 
Legislature's strong interest in prohibiting sexual orientation dis-
crimination.201 
Because both James Dale and Timony Curran were young 
adults when the BSA excluded them upon their "coming out," I urge 
state courts to consider the following issues confronting gay youth. 
Gay youth represent about 28% of the dropout rate in public 
schools.202 About one-third of the nearly 5000 annual suicides by 
adolescents are committed by young gays and lesbians.203 In one 
study, 40% of the 221 gay youth questioned reported having at-
tempted suicide at least once.204 Attempts to account for these sta-
tistics suggest that "societal condemnation of homosexuality [means 
that] growing up gay or lesbian often has a negative impact on 
one's psychological development. [M]any gay and lesbian youth ... 
experience adolescence characterized by isolation, fear, and emo-
tional distress."205 In fact, it was at a conference at Rutgers Uni-
constructing identity."». 
198. Id. 
199. See id. at 1242 (citing Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A 
Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 134 (1991) (relying on 
social science data to debunk "longstanding cultural myths and stereotypes that depict 
lesbians and gay men as immoral, criminal, sick, and drastically different from what 
most members of society would consider 'normalm». 
200. See id. at 1243 (citing Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual 
Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 44 (1994) (stating that most child abusers are 
heterosexuals); David Newton, Homosexual Behavior and Child Molestation: A Review of 
the Evidence, 13 ADOLESCENCE 29 (1978». 
201. See id. at 1239. 
202. See Armstrong, supra note 8, at 77. 
203. See id. at 75 (citing Andrew Kurtzman, Gay Teens Harassed in New York 
Schools: Advocates Say Homophobia Is the Last Form of Intolerance Allowed to Flourish, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 5, 1992, at D6); Scott L. Hershberger et al., Predictors of 
Suicide Attempts Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth, 12 J. ADOLESCENT REs. 477, 
477 (1997). 
204. See Hershberger et al., supra note 203, at 481, 492. 
205. Arnold H. Grossman & Matthew S. Kerner, Self-Esteem and Supportiveness as 
Predictors of Emotional Distress in Gay Male and Lesbian Youth, 35 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 
25, 35 (1998); see also Ken Corbett, Cross-Gendered Identifications and Homosexual 
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versity addressing "the unique problems faced by homosexual teen-
agers struggling to come to terms with their sexual orientation, in-
cluding an alarmingly high incidence of suicide attempts," that 
James Dale spoke of his own experiences as a gay youth.206 The 
leading stressors accounting for these statistics have been identified 
as the "awareness of [homosexual youth of] their homoerotic attrac-
tions," the "disclosure of [their] sexual orientation" to others, es-
pecially where they have experienced rejection following such dis-
closure, and the "victimization provoked by their sexual orienta-
tion."207 Thus, homosexual youth, overall, are in great distress. A 
critical aspect of this distress may be the extent to which homosex-
ual teenagers are supported, or at least not excluded, by those 
groups or individuals whom the teenager considers important to his 
or her life.20B Courts considering whether to allow an entity like 
BSA to exclude homosexuals should take into account the findings 
of studies such as these,209 much the same way the Supreme 
Boyhood: Toward a More Complex Theory of Gender, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 352, 
353 (1998) (describing the developmental problems boys may face due to the traditional 
fixed definition of gender by noting that "boys are made anxious when characterized as 
feminine, or when they feel themselves to be outside the bounds of traditional masculini· 
ty"). 
206. Dale, 734 A2d at 1239 n.4 (Handler, J., concurring). From this conference an 
interview with Dale was published in a newspaper that made its way to BSA authori· 
ties. See id. 
207. Hershberger et al., supra note 203, at 479-80. 17% of the 221 homosexual 
youths questioned reported that they had been physically assaulted and 80% had been 
the victims of verbal insults. See id. at 480--81. 
208. While the Grossman & Kerner study indicates that supportiveness can be con· 
sidered an unimportant factor, the authors call for further research on this issue, with 
specific focus on the "type of support, e.g., emotional, social, and from designated people, 
e.g., parents, friends, [and] teachers." Grossman & Kerner, supra note 205, at 37. 
209. Somewhat ironically, it seems that the Boy Scout philosophy embodied in the 
Scout Oath and Law helped to equip James Dale with the resilience necessary to 
overcome the struggles listed above. He stated, 
I believed that the Scout Oath stood for my commitment to live an honorable 
life, to set high standards for myself, and to do my best to serve others. In my 
more than twelve years as a member of BSA, I strove never to do anything 
inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath . . . . As I grew . . . 
older, my commitment to Scouting deepened. Scouting . . . taught me how to 
deal with the ethical choices I encountered as a teenager. 
Dale, 734 A2d at 1226-27; see also David Rakoff, The Way We Live Now: 8·22·99; Ques· 
tions for James Dale: Camping Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 
17 (Dale stated: "I was always picked on a lot in school, but the Boy Scouts was a 
community that accepted me, welcomed me, gave me positive reinforcement."); 
Szymanski, supra note 160, at B·11. In discussing her decision to resign from the Navy 
due to her sexual orientation, the author states, "I held the Navy's Core Values of hon· 
or, courage and commitment dear to my heart - and still do. The Navy taught me that 
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Court examined the impact of segregated education in Brown v. 
Board of Education.21o 
In addition to the issues facing homosexual youth, state courts 
should also consult studies regarding the theory of "intergroup con-
tact."211 Subsequent studies have summarized Allport's theory as 
a prediction that intergroup contact will "lead to reduced intergroup 
prejudice if... the contact situation meets four conditions: 
(1) equal status between the groups in the situation, (2) common 
goals [among those in the group], (3) no competition between 
groups, and (4) authority sanction for the contact."212 The basic 
idea is that if individuals from different racial groups interact with-
in the above parameters, prejudice will be reduced, both within the 
contact group as well as with other people the individuals come into 
contact with later on. While a number of studies conclude that 
Allport's theory is not supported by sufficient empirical evi-
dence,213 others suggest that these studies are faulty.214 Howev-
er, certain types of intergroup contact provide significant support 
for the theory.215 Additional studies also indicate support for the 
theory, with some refinements,216 especially where sexual orienta-
tion differences displace racial differences.217 Herek and Capitano 
courage that gives us the moral and mental strength to do what is right, even in the 
face of adversity." Id. 
210. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94. 
211. Originally espoused by Gordon W. Allport, in his book THE NATURE OF PREJu-
DICE, supra note 13, at 281. 
212. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice, 23 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 173, 173 (1997); see also Thomas F. Pettigrew, 
Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 65, 66-67 (1998) [hereinafter 
Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory] (elaborating on each of the four requirements); 
Christopher B. Smith, Back to the Future: The Intergroup Contact Hypothesis Revisited, 
64 SOC. INQUIRY 438, 438 (1994) (discussing the four requirements set forth by Allport). 
213. See Donna M. Desforges et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on 
Changing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531-32 (1991) (citing studies indicating how narrow the parameters 
of Allport's theory are); Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Manuel Barajas, Intimate Social Con-
tact, Cultural Proximity, and Prejudice Toward Mexican-Origin Persons: A Modified 
Application of Contact Theory 4-5 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Stetson Law Review) (citing studies that show that contact does not overcome prejudice 
based on status differences). 
214. See Smith, supra note 212, at 440-42. 
215. See Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, supra note 212, at 67-68 (citing, for 
example, studies of the Merchant Marines after desegregation and studies comparing 
desegregated public housing with segregated public housing). 
216. See Smith, supra note 212, at 453. 
217. See Herek & Capitanio, supra note 13, at 422. 
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concluded that "[h]eterosexuals who had experienced interpersonal 
contact with gay men or lesbians expressed significantly more fa-
vorable general attitudes toward gay people than heterosexuals 
without contact."218 They surmise that the results of their study, 
compared to results of studies of interracial contact, indicate more 
positive attitudes due to the fact that homosexuality is often a con-
cealable stigma.219 The significance of the concealable stigma 
means that a heterosexual who is friends with a homosexual has 
probably "directly discussed homosexuality. .. and consequently 
has acquired greater insight and empathy for their situation. ,,220 
By contrast, "a White person can have a Black friend but never 
discuss issues related to race in any depth . . . . [Thus, the White 
person] might still retain negative stereotypes and attitudes toward 
African Americans as a group. ,,221 Apart from the likelihood that 
the heterosexual will discuss homosexuality with the gay friend 
(after all, Boy Scouts are not to discuss within their groups any 
issues relating to sex) the fact that the stigma is concealed means 
that the homosexual "is evaluated on the basis of factors apart from 
her or his stigmatized status."222 Essentially, this indicates that if 
prejudice and intolerance are based, in large part, on ignorance and 
fear/23 where otherwise intolerant, or less tolerant, people get to 
know a member of a stigmatized group in a context where the stig-
ma does not create barriers,224 upon learning of the stigma, such 
individuals are likely to reevaluate their prior attitudes about, in 
this case, homosexuals. Thus, while the social science evidence 
regarding the accuracy of the intergroup contact theory may be 
218. Id. at 420. 
219. See id. at 422. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 412. The concealable status factor may also address another criticism of 
Allport's theory. One parameter is that equal status exists within the context of the 
intergroup contact; however, some commentators have argued that this is impossible 
with a situation where is no equal status. See Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 
supra note 212, at 66. If the stigma is concealable, there is a greater likelihood that the 
individuals in the group situation are equal both coming into and within the situation. 
Id. 
223. See supra notes 8, 10. 
224. See Herek & Capitanio, supra note 13, at 412. 
When majority group members interact with someone who has a readily ap-
parent stigma, they are likely from the outset to encode information about that 
person in terms of her or his minority status. Their preexisting attitudes and 
beliefs about the stigmatized group are likely to influence their evaluations of 
the individual exemplar. . . . 
1999] Advancing Tolerance and Equality 269 
inconclusive when the stigma is race, the fact that homosexuals can 
conceal their identity demonstrates that where heterosexuals have 
close contact with homosexuals who are "passing"225 and the other 
parameters of Allport's prediction are present, such contact results 
in significantly positive attitudes about homosexuals, as compared 
to the attitudes of heterosexuals who have not had such contact. 
Such consideration can aid state courts in their efforts to give 
meaning to their state's constitutional provisions, beyond an exam-
ination of only the text, history or other unique factors, as Paul 
Kahn urges.226 It is interesting that Justice Handler first specifi-
cally articulated the unique factors a state court should consider in 
interpreting its state constitution,227 and his opinion in Dale 
serves as a prime example, in this Article, of the relevance and 
importance of courts looking to a variety of sources when resolving 
these types of conflicts. My proposal is simply that state courts put 
this idea together with the objective of abandoning the traditional 
dichotomies and replacing them with a balancing that considers the 
potential impact of the result as well as the significance of the 
interests at stake which do not fit into one of the traditional ei-
ther/or categories. Study of such opposites only serves to stifle and 
narrow analysis rather than to advance it. 
225. However, concealing one's sexual orientation is not without its costs. James 
Dale stated that "he lived a double life, while in high school, pretending to be straight 
while attending military academy ... [and he looked for] a community that would take 
him in and provide him with a support network and friends." Dale, 734 A.2d at 1239-40 
(Handler, J., concurring); see also Robert Lisyte, A Major League Player's Life of Isola-
tion and Subterfuge, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1999, at D9 (describing how Billy Bean's 
efforts to conceal his homosexuality resulted in "a great deal of guilt and self-hate"). 
226. See supra note 28. 
227. See supra note 27. 
